Security (Why FreeBSD?)
(general cleanup, as well as differentiating between the security provided by wheel-only su, and OpenSSH configured not to allow root logins) |
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Furthermore, because only users in group [[wheel]] can [[su]] to root, even if a remote attacker knows root's password, the attacker is powerless if he cannot access the account of a user in group [[wheel]]. | Furthermore, because only users in group [[wheel]] can [[su]] to root, even if a remote attacker knows root's password, the attacker is powerless if he cannot access the account of a user in group [[wheel]]. | ||
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Revision as of 12:04, 30 December 2004
FreeBSD has a significantly better security record, particularly as concerns out-of-the-box security, than most Linux distributions. For example, a default FreeBSD installation includes OpenSSH configured to disallow root logins -- a potential attacker must first know the account name of a user in the wheel group (because only users in group wheel can use su), log in as that user, and then su to root. Most Linux distributions instead install OpenSSH configured to allow root logins, which is more insecure because it allows a cracker to use an automated program to attempt dictionary or brute-force attacks against the root account.
Furthermore, because only users in group wheel can su to root, even if a remote attacker knows root's password, the attacker is powerless if he cannot access the account of a user in group wheel.
